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Abstract
Embodied cognition, which might be traced back to Immanuel Kant’s 
philosophy, is a sort of compatibilist (coupling) perspective regarding the 
problematic relation between mind and world. The point is that the very idea 
of an embodiment partly determines all the cognitive processes available to 
an organism such as the human being, since mind, body, and world interact 
and influence one another in order to achieve adaptive success in a Darwinian 
fashion. In this sense, I would like to investigate how some ideas (especially the 
‘practical cognition’ – praktische Erkenntnis, according to Kant in the preface 
of his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals) such as the idea of God (of 
wholeness, since all cognition involves unification into a organic, coherent 
whole), of morals, and so forth, could be part of our learning about the world. To 
put it another way, in which sense thinking, e.g. about God, morals, democracy, 
liberalism etc., is the result of our ability to interact with our environment in 
order to be a well-adapted species? The embodiment of practical cognition, 
as well as the theoretical one, is the result of our sensorimotor experiences 
that, given the plasticity of our brains, enable us to successfully interact with 
our environment. In sum, “our” world, even from a practical point of view, is 
not observer-independent: it is the result of our agency on it. 
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Resumo
Conhecimento corporeificado, o qual pode ser rastreado até a filosofia de 
Immanuel Kant, é uma forma de perspectiva compatibilista (unitiva) acerca da 
relação problemática entre mente e mundo. A questão é que a ideia mesma 
de uma corporeificação, em parte, determina todos os processos cognitivos 
disponíveis para um organismo como o ser humano, uma vez que mente, corpo 
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We might find a sort of proto-embodied cognition in Kant’s epistemology. In 
spite of his well-known rejection of John Locke’s approach, which Kant criticizes in 
his “Kritik der reinen Vernunft” (A 86/87; B 118/119), in the context of its ‘Analytic 
of concepts’ (at the core of the deduction of the pure concepts of understanding), 
Kant does not reject a physiological perspective at all. In the aformentioned part of 
the KrV Kant is, at any rate, clear about what exactly he rejects regarding Locke’s 
point of view: “a deduction of the pure a priori concepts can never be obtained in 
this manner” (Kant, 1965, B 119, p. 122), to wit, in the manner in which Locke did 
it in his essay (Locke, 1996). That is because such “physiological derivation concerns 
a quaestio facti” (Kant, 1965, B 119, p. 122), which means “it cannot strictly be 
called deduction” (Kant, 1965, B 119, p. 122)2. And, as it is very well-known, Kant 
was looking for a deduction, that is, for a quaestio juris, for a rational justification 
of the theoretical use of the categories of understanding (Verstand). 
So certainly Kant himself rejected Locke’s physiological derivation. But if we pay 
due attention to what Kant says in the ‘transcendental aesthetic’, we will acknowledge 
that Kant did not give up physiology altogether. In it we can find some arguments 
against the (mistaken) idea of a “nativist Kant”. Surely Kant was not himself an 
empiricist, nor a sensationist, strictly speaking. I think Kant was in between: he was 
neither an empiricist nor a nativist. An interesting way of setting it forth is by using 
a more up-to-date language. According to the current image regarding the mind, 
it works like devices such as computers. So we have inputs, a processing of these 
inputs (the information processing), and an output. But the point is that Kant was 
not a classicist. In Kant’s perspective, the mind does not only mirror the world. It is 
not a mere passive retrieval device. Even using that up-to-date language, expressed 
in computational concepts, we might think not only in terms of problem-solving 
(computational) operations. The organism’s internal cognitive process involves not 
only computation and representation, but it is also “molded” by its relation with the 
environment. In other words, through the input information gets into the system, 
which causes a chain of events inside the device/mind. That is the processing itself 
taking place. At the end of this same process we have the output. Nowadays the 
philosophers of mind would call these outputs “propositional attitudes”.
2 Locke’s sensationalist (Kant calls it “physiological” – physiologische) account of perception may be seen in 
his Essay, especially in Book II, chapter I. That is probably the text Kant had in mind when he called Locke’s 
deduction a “physiologische” one.
e mundo interagem e se infuenciam uns aos outros com o propósito de obter 
sucesso adaptativo em uma perspectiva darwiniana. Nesse sentido, eu gostaria 
de investigar como algumas ideias (especialmente a de ‘cognição prática’ - 
“conhecimento prático”, segundo Kant no prefácio de sua Fundamentação da 
Metafísica dos Costumes), como a ideia de Deus (de totalidade, uma vez que 
toda cognição envolve unificação em um todo orgânico, coerente), de moral 
e assim por diante, poderiam ser parte de nosso aprendizado sobre o mundo. 
Em outros termos, em que sentido pensar, por exemplo, sobre Deus, moral, 
democracia, liberalismo, etc, é o resultado de nossa habilidade de interagir 
com nosso ambiente com o propósito de sermos uma espécie bem adaptada? 
A corporificação do conhecimento prático, bem como do teórico, é o resultado 
de nossa experiência sensório-motor, a qual, dada a plasticidade de nossos 
cérebros, nos capacitam para bem sucedidamente interagirmos com nosso 
ambiente. Em suma, “nosso” mundo, mesmo de um ponto de vista prático, 
não independe do observador: ele resulta de nossa ação sobre ele.
Palavras-chave: cognição, teleologia, moral.
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Yet, speaking in a Kantian fashion, the input would be called ‘sensation’ 
(sensatio), while the output would be called theoretical cognition. And, given this 
analogy, Kant will sustain, against both the empiricists and the nativists, that at the 
first moment we do not have innate ideas (nor do we have only sensations). That is 
because there must be an order in which that data must be given to us. So in order 
to understand Kant properly we must pay attention to the fact that for Kant the 
sensorimotor experience is a compound of sensory stimuli (information) and order 
(Kant would say: ‘matter’ and ‘form’ of cognition). This means that we are not ut-
terly passive recipients of raw data. We are active agents in this process. There is no 
order in Nature itself, according to Kant. I mean, at least we, as human beings, are 
not allowed to know that. On that account, the order ought to be in the agent, in 
his/her mind, “in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way” (Kant, 1965, B 33, 
p. 65)3. And the mind is firstly affected: “In the order of time, therefore, we have 
no knowledge antecedent to experience, and with experience all our knowledge 
begins” (Kant, 1965, B 1, p. 41). Thus in the beginning lies the sensation, and it 
always occurs in the framework of time and space (the pure forms of all intuition). 
But these very ideas, or forms (to put it in in a Kantian way), are not ready for us 
to use them, that is, they are not given innately in our minds. Anyway, they are not 
given in sensations either. What is innate is “the formal character of the subject, in 
virtue of which, in being affected by objects, it obtains immediate representation, 
that is, intuition, of them” (Kant, 1965, B 41, p. 70-71). The pure forms of intuition 
are, then, part of the “formal” character of the subject, and this “formal character” 
is the way in which we are constituted. Kant gives us some clues to understand that, 
such as when he says that “we know nothing but our mode of perceiving them – a 
mode which is peculiar to us, and not necessarily shared in by every being, though, 
certainly, by every human being” (Kant, 1965, B 59, p. 82). In sum, “our nature is so 
constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains 
only the mode in which we are affected by objects” (Kant, 1965, B 75, p. 93). But 
the point is that the cognitive process is not fully inside our heads (in our Gemüt, 
as Kant might have put it). It seems defensible that Kant outlined some ideas that 
might be corroborated by the forthcoming embodied cognition, in spite of his 
untenable metaphysical foundations4.
Anyway, having this background regarding Kant’s epistemology, we may now 
surmise that there is a missing key idea in Kant’s philosophical approach, to wit, the 
idea of evolution. Even though he himself seems to recognize the importance of the 
way we are “constituted” (Unsre Natur bringt es so mit sich, da die Anschauung 
niemals anders als sinnlich sein kann, d.i. nur die Art enthält, wie wir von Gegen-
ständen affiziert werden) for us to have cognition, he could not go any further. 
In any event, I think we must go one step further and try to examine some of 
Kant’s ideas in the light of evolution as well as of the idea of an embodied cognition, 
in order to comprehend how cognition, theoretical and practical, occurs in our minds.
So far I was talking about a theoretical cognition. But what about practical 
cognition? Well, I believe cognition, both theoretical and practical, has only one 
3 Here I am following Norman Kemp Smith’s translation, who translated Gemüt as mind. But in Kant, as we 
are going to see, this concept, Gemüt, is broader than the word mind would suggest. 
4 An interesting example was given by Kant himself. In the ‘introduction’ to his KrV (B 15, p. 53) he gives this 
revealing example: “The concept of 12 is by no means already thought in merely thinking this union of 7 and 
5; and I may analyse my concept of such a possible sum as long I please, still I shall never find the 12 in it. 
We have to go outside these concepts, and call in the aid of the intuition which corresponds to one of them, 
our five fingers, for instance […]” (Kant, 1965, B 15, p. 53). I believe that this is an unfortunate example to 
explain Kant’s point. But it is quite illustrative if we are speculating about some of Kant’s insights regarding an 
‘embodied cognition’. After all, in his example we see that we are able to formulate and to solve a mathematical 
proposition by appealing to our body, to the way we are constituted (in this case, to our fingers).
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root. Keeping Kant’s philosophy as our background, it would be quite enlightening 
to pay attention to what Kant understood by Gemüt, which is usually translated as 
“mind”. The point is that mind suggests a kind of theoretical activity (a speculative 
– spekulative – one). It seems we are talking about a theoretical feature only. But in 
Kant Gemüt refers to the whole of our faculties. And all the higher faculties are the 
following ones (“The faculties of the mind – Gemüt –, namely, can all be reduced to 
the following three” [Kant, 2000, 245, p. 44]): (i) faculty of cognition (restricted to 
the faculty of understanding); (ii) feeling of pleasure and displeasure (which refers to 
the power/faculty of judgment); and (iii) faculty of desire (related to reason) (Kant, 
2000, 245, p. 44-45). Each of them has a distinct principle (lawfulness, purposive-
ness and purposiveness that is at the same time obligation) and a precise field of 
application (nature, art and morals, respectively). So mind is not only a faculty of 
theoretical knowledge: it is also the faculty that allows us to comprehend the whole, 
I mean, the World in a broader sense, in a sense which may to enfold the theoreti-
cal as well as the practical meaning of this same world, understood here therefore 
as the whole. Those higher faculties constitute what Kant understood as “mind” 
(Gemüt)5. Hence mind is a many-sided trait. It enables us to apprehend the whole, 
giving this World a full meaning.
On that ground I am now interested in investigating the possibility of a “practical 
embodied cognition”, the kind of cognition that paved the way directly to ideas such 
as the ideas we can find in morals, especially the idea of the whole, which is closely 
related to idea of God. As a matter of fact, I borrow the idea of “practical cognition” 
from Kant; but I will give it another perspective. In his “Groundwork of the metaphys-
ics of morals” (Kant, 1999) (Die Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785), in its 
preface, Kant, all of a sudden, refers to a praktische Erkenntnis, a ‘practical cognition’, 
which sounds quite strange if we have in mind that until this work ‘cognition’ was, 
properly speaking, theoretical, since it was limited to those boundaries established in 
the KrV. How could he now, in 1785, just say that there is such a kind of cognition? 
Well, it is not my aim here to explain why Kant described moral laws (moralische Ge-
setze) as cognition, which must have something to do with the idea that the moral 
law is, as a theoretical cognition, objectively valid. It is not a matter of faith, nor even 
of opinion. It is a kind of cognition that lies on a different foundation.
By any means, what I want to investigate here is “what if” we try to explain 
it in the framework of Darwin’s perspective. So “what if” we conceive this practical 
cognition in terms of evolution as well as in terms of the advances achieved by the 
philosophy of mind (such as the very idea of an embodied cognition or the idea of 
an extended mind)?
So let’s assume that Kant was right about that: in the practical field we 
have also a kind of cognition: a practical one. The point is, now, to show that this 
is a natural process (as a process that involves Nature). In this sense, I am talking 
here of a kind of “natural autonomy”, which is only a self-rule without reference 
to supernatural powers. This is a way of understanding Kant in a natural perspec-
tive, a perspective he would not allow, at least not so explicitly, since the purpose 
of salvaging metaphysics was part of his agenda. But the point is that I am trying 
to reconcile the transcendental with Nature: the transcendental grows from our 
relation with Nature. 
5 We should not identify Gemüt with soul. As we may read in the KrV: “By means of outer sense, a property 
of our mind (einer Eigenschaft unsres Gemüts), we represent to ourselves objects as outside of us, and all 
without exception in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another are determined or 
determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind (Gemüt) intuits itself or its inner state, yelds indeed 
no intuition of the soul (Seele) itself as an object” (Kant, 1965, B 37, p. 67).
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To that end, as previously mentioned, each of those higher faculties has a 
principle, a transcendental one, which each faculty applies in order to comprehend 
Nature properly. In this sense, those transcendental principles are achieved through 
acting on Nature (not exactly from Nature, as in traditional empiricism, but through 
our interaction with Nature). A different (outer) Nature would give rise to different 
(inner) transcendental principles, determining a different judgment of Nature. And 
all the three principles are somehow connected, harmonized with each other, and 
the moral principle is the more important one. It has, as it was put by Kant himself 
in his “Critique of Practical Reason” (Kant, 1993) (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 
1788), the primacy over the theoretical one6. And “by primacy between two or 
more things connected by reason, I understand the prerogative of one by virtue of 
which it is the prime ground of determination of the combination with the others” 
(Kant, 1993, 120, p. 126). In sum, 
to every faculty of the mind (Gemüt) an interest can be ascribed, i.e., a principle which 
contains the condition under which alone its exercise is advanced. Reason, as the faculty 
of principles, determines the interest of all the powers of the mind (Gemüt) and its 
own. The interest of its speculative use consists in the knowledge of objects up to the 
highest a priori principles; that of its practical employment lies in the determination 
of the will with respect to the final and perfect end. That which is needed in general 
for the possibility of any employment of reason, i.e., that its principles and assertions 
not contradict one another, is not a part of its interest but rather the condition of 
having any reason at all (Kant, 1993, 120, p. 126). 
The primacy of the practical over the theoretical/speculative is connected to 
the idea that the practical reason, which provides a practical cognition, presents to 
us the “final and perfect end”. This kind of idea is not something just “invented” (as 
in fiction). It is something our mind just apperceives while reflecting about Nature. 
Therefore theoretical cognition is a sort of by-product, a side effect of this pursuit 
of that “final and perfect end”, of the acquisition of a practical cognition. As Kant 
himself says, “[…] every interest is ultimately practical, even that of speculative 
reason being only conditional and reaching perfection only in practical use” (Kant, 
1993, 122, p. 128). 
Since mechanical explanations (through the category of causality) are insuf-
ficient to fulfill the claims of reason, the explanation demands a new approach to 
Nature, the teleological one (a “para-mechanical” explanation, so to speak). Accord-
ingly, reason is also regulative. There are fundamental ideas of reason such as the 
ideas of God, freedom, as well as the idea of the World as a whole, that are essential 
for us to apprehend Nature in its totality. These ideas a sine qua non condition for 
us to judge Nature as having an asymptotic progress towards a full understanding 
of it, of its meaning and purpose. It is only through this regulative use of reason 
that we can see some coherence in Nature. And even this regulative use is, at least 
as far as I understand it, embodied (I mean: at least it might be understood as em-
bodied, for reasons I am going to discuss later on in this paper). It is the result of 
an embodiment. At some point it was necessary to judge Nature purposively, that 
is, according to an idea of a purposively arranged system. The reason for this can be 
exemplified by using one of Kant’s examples: “the internal form of a mere blade of 
grass can demonstrate its merely possible origin in accordance with the rule of ends 
in a way that is sufficient for our human faculty for judging” (Kant, 2000, 378, p. 
6 See Kant (1993, 120, p. 126). See especially the section titled “On the primacy of pure practical Reason in 
its association with speculative Reason”.
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250). Nature, as it has appeared before us since the beginning, molded our faculties 
in order to allow us to know it. Without the very idea of a purpose, for example, 
many things in Nature would be unknown to us. The artifacts we create are repro-
ductions of what we observe in Nature. Nature taught us how to produce artificial 
organisms. In the same way we are now producing, for instance, AI, using our own 
mind as a model, in the distant past we learned how to produce artifacts that be-
have just like natural organisms, in which we have observed that each part worked 
for the functioning of the whole. That is how the “transcendental” developed (got 
embodied) inside our minds: through our interrelation with Nature, which provided 
us with the idea of a “formative power” (bildende Kraft)7. We arrived at this very 
idea by apprehending Nature’s purposiveness. This is a regulative principle, which 
we can use (our reason) in order to comprehend Nature as a whole. Although it is 
not a constitutive principle, as the twelve categories of understanding (Verstand) 
are, it is, nonetheless, a necessary principle. After all, how would it be possible for 
us to judge a natural event such as the one Kant uses to exemplify the very idea 
of a “natural end” (Naturzweck), to wit, a tree? In § 64 (Kant, 2000, 371, p. 243) 
he illustrates this point firstly explaining that a simple tree generates another tree 
of the same genus, perpetuating itself generically; secondly, it produces itself as 
an individual, having as its sustenance the raw material Nature offers. And thirdly, 
its parts depend, for their maintenance, reciprocally on each other (“one part of 
this creature also generates itself in such a way that the preservation of the one 
is reciprocally dependent of the preservation of the others” (Kant, 2000, 371, p. 
243). I believe this is a good example, since it points out the way in which the idea 
of purposiveness was imprinted on us in order to constitute the transcendental 
principle that allows us to judge Nature as having a meaning. I mean, in a distant 
past we started to observe this kind of natural event just happening before us. At 
that time we certainly did not have the idea of purposiveness, but after some time, 
a long time, our mind was molded by the way we saw Nature (in a relationship that 
has molded also our senses, which, in turn, determined the way our minds work). 
In the beginning we probably felt surprised observing such a simulacrum of purpo-
siveness. And the more we observed that purposiveness, the stronger it became. As 
a matter of fact, it became innate and so extraordinarily complex that we are now 
able to judge Nature as a coherent whole. Our faculties just work better in such a 
World. I mean, we are a well-adapted species since we have a well-adapted mind. 
And what I am trying to argue here is that this adaptation was the result of an 
embodiment. The transcendental, the more “spiritualized” facet of human nature, 
has an embodied dimension. And in the order of time it began with some basic 
sensory experiences (such as in Kant’s tree example), which, along our evolutionary 
history, brought us to those increasingly faculties, such as the most important of 
them, the moral one. In this sense, we certainly were not moral agents in the dawn 
of our history as beings capable of rationality, that is, as a sort of animal that fits the 
idea of an animal rationabilis, which simply means we have a “capacity for reason”, 
a capacity of directing our lives rationally8. At some point we became capable to 
weigh Nature according to some ends, moral ones. And all these ends sprout from 
the idea of moral law. This was the first rule. But the question is: “But what kind of 
law can that be, the representation of which must determine the will, even with-
out regard for the effect expected from it, in order for the will to be called good 
7 Kant took this important idea from Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840), with whom he exchanged 
letters regarding biological and anthropological themes.
8 This does not mean, then, that we are rational animals (as the in the traditional idea of an animal rationale). 
We are, so, fallibly rational beings. See Kant (1974, 321, p. 183).
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absolutely and without limitation?” As is well known, the supreme principle may 
be stated as follows: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also 
will that my maxim should become a universal law” (Kant, 1999, 402, p. 57). This 
law, the moral law, is something that became innate, in the sense that “common 
human reason also agrees completely with this in its practical appraisals and always 
has this principle before its eyes”. The innatism of this position can be identified in 
many parts of Kant’s Groundwork, such as in that passage in which he says that 
we have arrived, within the moral cognition of common human reason, at its principle, 
which it admittedly does not think so abstractly in a universal form but which it actu-
ally has always before its eyes and uses as the norm for its appraisals. Here it would 
be easy to show how common human reason, with this compass in hand, knows very 
well how to distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and what is evil, 
what is in conformity with duty or contrary to duty, if, without in the least teaching it 
anything new, we only, as did Socrates, make it attentive to its own principle; and that 
there is, accordingly, no need of science and philosophy to know what one has to do 
in order to be honest and good, and even wise and virtuous (Kant, 1999, 404, p. 58).
Thus we have this kind of “compass” as a guide that helps us to give Nature 
a meaning. But the point is, again, that this “compass” became innate after a long 
time of interaction with Nature itself. It is part of the embodiment of the transcen-
dental, of those elements that make it possible for us to apprehend Nature in a 
specific framework. This embodied practical law, the moral law, made it possible 
for us to have the ideas of freedom, immortality and God. In Kant’s language, they 
are postulates. And “the postulates of pure practical reason all proceed from the 
principle of morality, which is not a postulate but a law by which reason directly 
determines the will” (Kant, 1993, 132, p. 138). Since we had the moral law before 
our “mind’s eye”, it was inevitable to have also such postulates. But in Kant we do 
not have a suitable, unifying, principle to understand such ideas. But the important 
point is that Kant recognized that some elements, the formal/transcendental ones, 
were “awakened into action” with experience. Kant was not aware of the mecha-
nism through which this could have happened. He reached important conclusions 
without knowing the mechanism that produced such an order in Nature. Anyway, 
his conclusions are not conflicting with the idea of an embodied cognition, theo-
retical and practical. He just did not have the key idea in order to understand such 
an embodiment. 
However, in the 19th century things changed. After all, Charles Darwin gave 
us another perspective through which we can understand more properly the way 
we are “molded”, that is, the way we are thus constituted. Kant took the way in 
which we are constituted for granted and did not ask about the natural reasons 
why we are thus formed. This was, for him, something just given. But since Darwin 
we have an explanation for it, a natural one (which, I believe, does not conflict with 
the transcendental one).
So since embodied cognition is a “research programme”, as it was put by 
Larry Shapiro in his paper (Shapiro, 2007), let’s assume that there is such a practi-
cal embodied cognition, that is, let’s take a step further, although in doing that we 
certainly will reach a conclusion Kant did not want to reach (after all, as I just have 
said above, Kant intention was to salvage metaphysics). 
But the point for me here is to see, on Kant’s shoulders (nanos gigantium 
humeris insidentes), some ethical themes at another level: the level of metaethics 
and of environmental ethics. That is because I want to investigate the meaning of 
some of our moral concepts in the context of our relation with our own environment.
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Given I am talking about practical cognition and Nature, let’s think about the 
role the environment plays in the development of this “practical cognition”. This 
assumption would explain the origin of our moral concepts as well as prove the 
importance of our environment (and the consequent concern we must have with it).
Until the 18th century it was very usual to leap from a teleological judgment 
of the World to the very idea of a Creator (from the design to the designer). Natural 
Theology was (maybe it still is, for most people) something quite intuitive. It was 
usually connected to a physicotheological proof of the existence of God, a proof 
which Kant defines, in his “Lectures on Philosophical Theology” (1817), in the fol-
lowing way: “The physicotheological proof is the one in which we infer from the 
constitution of the present World to the nature of its Author” (Kant, 1986, p. 36). 
Elsewhere in the same text he says: “Human reason has need of an idea of highest 
perfection, to serve it as a standard according to which it can make determinations” 
(Kant, 1986, p. 21). 
Given this characterization of God, of the whole that serves “as a standard”, 
we might now ask in which sense embodiment determined the practical cognitive 
processes that allowed us to arrive at the “highest idea”. To put it another way, 
what was the formative role of the environment in the evolution of the practical 
cognitive processes that gave rise to this kind of idea?
Well, having the “fact” of evolution as our background, we are now able to 
think the practical cognition as a “dynamic system”, which enables us to think about 
the rising of moral ideas, especially the highest one, the idea – or metaphor – of 
God, evolving over time in our evolutionary history. The point is that we get to this 
metaphorical reasoning through the physical properties of our bodies (through their 
development). While using the metaphor – God/wholeness, e.g. – we are able to 
understand life and its meaning. That was precisely Kant’s concern in 1788, when 
he wrote the essay “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy” in order 
to explain a class of forms, the organized ones, the organisms. The first Kritik, KrV, 
had explained Nature in a causal fashion, through the Aristotelian idea of a causa 
efficiens, an efficient cause. But this kind of explanation, given our “nature”, was 
not satisfactory to explain living forms. And Kant was very aware of that. Even in his 
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, which was also written in 1788, we can find many 
passages (A 251; A 261; A 285, for instance9) in which he claims that it is necessary 
to judge Nature teleologically – as if (als ob) it had some finality (telos). The only 
way to understand life and its meaning is by metaphorically speaking of an Author 
of this World. Kant has the merit of realizing that point, in spite of his metaphysical 
conclusions. But he was not aware of the ‘fact’ of evolution, nor of the principle 
of adaptiveness. So he borrowed from Blumenbach the idea of a “formative force” 
(Bildungstrieb – nisum formativum) in order to explain the life forms. It was an 
advance, though, since it represents our ability to see the “big picture” of Nature. 
At some point of our natural history it proved to be important for us to apprehend 
Nature as a system, a dynamical one. Other creatures seem to apprehend Nature, 
if anything, inductively in a plain manner. And that was something David Hume 
and Charles Darwin both realized, namely, that some creatures (even the lower 
ones) were molded in order to see a connection between two separate events. 
This ability is, probably, the result of the interaction between mind and Nature. 
The more complex this relation became, the more complex the mind itself became, 
that is, the more complex became the way in which certain life forms started to 
apprehend Nature. As a matter of fact, our faculties became – together with other 
9 See Kant (1993, p. 138-168), from ‘On the postulates of Pure Practical reason’ to ‘Methodology of Pure 
Practical Reason’.
169
Filosofia Unisinos, 15(3):161-172, sep/dec 2014
Practical embodied cognition as a constructive process
creatures – more and more complex, to the point that we have now reached ideas 
such as the idea of God. But that’s something we share with non-human animals. 
As Darwin put it, “the lower animals, like man, manifestly feel pleasure and pain, 
happiness and misery” (Darwin, 2010, p. 38). In sum, “most of the more complex 
emotions and many of the more intellectual emotions and faculties are common 
to the higher animals and ourselves” (Darwin, 2010, p. 42). The basic elements for 
our social institutions, like religion, for instance, are also present in lower animals. 
After all: “There is no fundamental difference between man and the higher animals 
in their mental faculties” (Darwin, 2010, p. 40).
The evolution of morality, so I believe, was the path to the idea of God, and 
the road to it was a “long and winding road”. First, we started to make inductive 
inferences. Then, we started to choose among possible ends the ones that are more 
estimable from an evolutionary point of view. At the dawn of our intentionality, 
when the life forms were unimaginable simple, we can find the first specialized cells. 
An interesting description of this point is made by Daniel Dennett:
Four and half billion years ago, the planet Earth was formed, and it was utterly without 
life. And so it stayed for perhaps half a billion years, until the first simple life-forms 
emerged […]. Then finally much larger, more complex cells evolved – eukaryotes – still 
clueless and robotic, but with enough internal machinery to begin to specialize. So it 
continued for a few hundred million more years […] (Dennett, 2003, p. 5).
On that account, early in their evolutionary history, organisms developed the 
fundamental feature that allowed them to avoid harm and search for benefits. This 
rudimentary feature showed itself essential for the development of life itself. It was 
the rise of a useful ability, the ability to expect some regularity in Nature. In the early 
stages of life on Earth the primeval life forms already postulated an order in Nature 
in order to survive. And that “order” did not just happen to germinate in our minds, 
as something already there, just innately ready to use. In fact, the coupling between 
mind and Nature was necessary. This coupling was a successful marriage, a mar-
riage which gave birth to a mental offspring, in which we can find countless ideas, 
such as the very idea of regularity. And such ideas just got stronger and stronger, 
specially with the evolution of a new, and more recent, “trick”, namely, language.10
As a matter of fact, Nature formed11 the organisms in order for them to ap-
prehend it as if there were a regularity in it. If there were a different Nature, we 
would apprehend it differently, with different categories molded by the way we 
were molded by our relation with this very Nature.
At any rate, after some millions of years we arrived at an unifying ideal of 
the World, according to which nihil est sine ratione: “Nothing is without reason”. 
This “spiritual” evolution12 could only happen simultaneously with the physiological 
evolution. As we have complex thoughts only because we developed our language, 
which required the development of our vocal tract, of the physiological basis of our 
language, the same must have happened with those “spiritual” faculties, the faculties 
10 “In just one species, our species, a new trick evolved: language. It has provided us a broad highway of 
knowledge-sharing, on every topic. Conversation unites us, in spite of our different languages […]. No matter 
how different from one another we people are, scattered around the globe, we can explore our differences 
and communicate about them” (Dennett, 2003, p. 4).
11 I am not assuming there is any intentionality in Nature itself. That’s something we just cannot assume from 
a theoretical point of view. Here maybe we see the exact moment for that leap from knowledge to faith. To 
quote Kant: “I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith” (Kant, 
1965, B XXX, p. 29).
12 Understood as the evolution of our intellectual faculties.
170
Filosofia Unisinos, 15(3):161-172, sep/dec 2014
Carlos Adriano Ferraz
that made emotions and other mental states possible. Happiness, as one of those 
expressions, for example, required the development of our facial muscles, which are 
the physiological basis for happiness. And happiness itself demanded language in 
order to be a “propositional attitude”. In effect, the expression of our emotions is 
something just inherited. But in the the past it was not like this. It became, at some 
moment, innate. And innate here only means that it (the expression of our emo-
tions) was “integrated” into our biological system during our evolutionary history. In 
other words, they are innate because, at some point, they were important for us to 
be a well-adapted species. That is what Darwin himself called a ‘Lamarckian view’.
But the point I want to emphasize here is the relation between our body 
formation and the formation of our intellectual faculties, especially the moral one, 
which is something more recent in our evolutionary history. So, in his notebook N 
(1838-1839), Darwin gave us a precious insight, the idea that our language started 
with our ancestors imitating the sounds of Nature. In this sense, the evolution of 
language involved an interrelation between our ancestors and Nature. And this same 
evolution, after some time, a long time, gave us language as we know it. The devel-
opment of this “instinct” was only possible through this mimetic process. Nature, 
therefore, molded the physiological basis of our language (our vocal tract), which 
came, by the way, before our mental states (before we could have such states) (see 
e.g. Sellars, 1997). After all, our minds are molded by language. And language, in 
its dawn, was molded by Nature. As Darwin put it in his The Descent of Man:
[…] I cannot doubt that language owes its origin to the imitation and modification of 
various natural sounds, the voices of other animals, […]. As the voice was used more 
and more, the vocal organs would have been strengthened and perfected through 
the principle of the inherited effects of use; and this would have reacted on the power 
of speech. But the relation between the continued use of language and the develop-
ment of the brain, has no doubt been far more important. The mental powers in some 
early progenitor of man must have been more highly developed than in any existing 
ape, before even the most imperfect form of speech could have come into use; but 
we may confidently believe that the continued use and advancement of this power 
would have reacted on the mind itself, by enabling and encouraging it to carry on 
long trains of thought (Darwin, 2010, p. 38).
After being originated from that mimetic process of acquisition, language 
itself evolved, probably out of adaptive needs, especially the need for comunication. 
There is room for many speculations here. But the point is that it actually evolved. 
That’s a matter of fact (a “truth of fact” – vérité de fait). That same evolution made 
it possible for us to have abstract ideas, such as those ideas that may be put under 
the aegis of the “truths of reason” (vérités de raison), with God being the highest 
one. So certainly everything in Nature is complex. But we are extraordinarily com-
plex. This extraordinary aspect is remarkable regarding our mental faculties. They 
distinguish us (in many cases by degree not by kind) from the rest of Nature.
Our relation with Nature was directly influential concerning the acquisition 
and development of our language (physiologically speaking) and indirectly influen-
tial regarding the development of a “metaphorical reasoning”, which allowed us to 
have the ideas we postulate on Nature, such as the idea of the whole (intimately 
connected to the idea of God, of a designer). The issue here is about that question 
Dennett puts forth in his Freedom Evolves, chapter five, to wit: “Where does all the 
design come from?”
Evolution through the process of natural selection gave rise to the develop-
ment of new levels (more complex ones) of freedom. In this sense we have reached 
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a broader use of inductive inferences. The very idea of induction was probably born 
in our minds after we perceived that x followed y over and over again (just like in 
Kant’s example of a tree). After some time, a long time, we just arrived at the idea 
of a sort of verborgener Plan der Natur, a “secret plan of Nature”. In other words, 
we started to think about Nature through the idea of a causa finalis. And it did not 
take too long for us to judge Nature teleologically.
As realized by David Hume and Charles Darwin, to think inductively was an 
important achievement for us, human animals. As a matter of fact, many living 
forms do that: at some level it is essential for them to make inductive inferences in 
order to survive. This was an useful custom that became innate (it was imprinted 
on our Gemüt). And it also became as complex as our language: the more complex 
the living form is, the more complex is the way it judges Nature13. 
But what we have is only a sort of simulacrum of regularity, which was forti-
fied by the “aliveness” of our past experiences, in which we were able to see event 
2 following event 1 repeteadly. In our relation with Nature we (as many other living 
beings) “learn” how to know it in a causal manner. And this, to our luck, has been 
usually worked. And here we may assume the proximity between language and 
causal inferences: in the same way that language is the result of our relation with 
Nature, our World – Nature plus Culture – is the result of our linguistic interference 
in it. The evolution of this instinct, and here we have as take for granted the fact 
of evolution, enabled the extension of mind to Nature. An example taken from D. 
Chalmers and A. Clark is quite illustrative:
The extraordinary efficiency of the fish as a swimming device is partly due, it now 
seems, to an evolved capacity to couple its swimming behavior to the pools of external 
kinetic energy found at swirls, eddies and vortices in its environment (Chalmers and 
Clark, 1998, p. xx).
The “plasticity of the brain” was essential to this evolution. As we developed 
our language, the sensorimotor experiences started to serve as a basis for the 
formation of more complex concepts. So we have now the concepts of God, of 
purpose, and so on.
Our relation with the World is a two-way road: the way we are embodied is 
the result of Nature’s pressure on us and, at the same time, the way we are em-
bodied determines, through Culture, the way our World is. After all, the way the 
World partly determines our faculties determines the way the World appears to us.
We see here practical cognition as a constructive process, since the mutual 
specification between an organism and its environment produces a specific, sui 
generis sensorimotor device. This sensorimotor device is achieved through acting 
on Nature, in response to its pressure on us. And the same sensorimotor device 
reflects the manner according to which we are molded by Nature (and by the World 
as well). If Nature were different, we would certainly be different. Evolution would 
have required from us a different sensoriomotor device. So our ideas referring to this 
World would be also different. But since we have this sensorimotor device (which 
may be considered something contingent; I mean, since it is the result of our past 
needs, a different one would be logically possible), we have reached the ideas we 
13 “The feeling of religious devotion is a highly complex one, consisting of love, complete submission to an 
exalted and mysterious superior, a strong sense of dependence, fear, reverence, gratitude, hope for the future, 
and perhaps other elements. No being could experience so complex an emotion until advanced in his intellectual 
and moral faculties to at least a moderately high level. Nevertheless, we see some distinct approach to this 
state of mind in the deep love of a dog for his master, associated with complete submission, some fear, and 
perhaps other feelings” (Darwin, 2010, p. 38).
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effectively have in mind while judging Nature, such as the idea of God and the 
whole. The same, by the way, is true of our social institutions: the ideals of liberal-
ism, democracy, human rights, constitution, and so forth could be comprehended 
as the result of our interaction with Nature towards a well-adapted state.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned ideas, one question remains: mind, 
understood as Gemüt, as a set of faculties (with transcendental principles of their 
own), is molded by our relation with Nature, so we had got to the important idea 
of Nature as the whole (involving both Nature and the transcendental). The more 
we interact with Nature, the more it gets complex and, incredibly, the more it shows 
itself as intentional, purposeful. So the question is: is this regularity something that 
lies in Nature itself? 
Well, it was not my aim here to investigate that. My point was only to dem-
onstrate that embodiment is compatible with the transcendental. The problem of 
an intentionality inherent to Nature itself gives room for another investigation.
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